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WHERE'S THE EVIDENCE? DEALING WITH
SPOLIATION BY PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCT
LIABILITY CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are a boat manufacturer.' You are served with a
complaint which alleges that one of your products exploded due to a faulty
bilge pump switch and a leaking fuel system.2 The potential liability is quite
large because the plaintiff s husband was killed in the explosion.3 Your first
logical step is to ask for access to the boat so that you may investigate its
wreckage firsthand, but you learn that the plaintiffs expert ripped the boat
apart in the course of his examination.4 His investigation involved using a
chainsaw and sledge hammer to cut crucial sections of the boat.5 The boat was
damaged to such an extent that you are unable to inspect it.6
In defending the lawsuit, you must now, in the absence of any evidence in
your favor, overcome the jury's presumption that you are at fault. A boat you
manufactured exploded and killed someone, and the plaintiffhas an expert who
will testify that your product was responsible for the explosion.7 You have no
information about the most critical piece of evidence except that offered by the
opposing party.8 Furthermore, you have no effective method for verifying or,
preferably, disproving the claims made by the plaintiff s expert.9 Because you
cannot examine the boat, any theories you might advance regarding alternative
causes of the explosion are pure speculation. Clearly, you are severely
prejudiced in your ability to present a defense.
To what remedy should you be entitled because of the actions of the
plaintiff's expert? What sanction, if any, should the plaintiff face for his expert
destroying the evidence you need to fully defend the case? What if the plaintiff
had no knowledge that the expert would use such destructive methods in his
investigation? How should courts sanction plaintiffs when they neither actually
destroy the evidence nor order that it be destroyed? What authority does the
court have to impose sanctions?
Spoliation occurs when a party to a lawsuit destroys relevant evidence,
either carelessly or deliberately. Obviously, if it was done to gain an advantage
1. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 155.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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it would have to be deliberate, not careless.'0 Spoliation can result from the acts
of either party or a third party." In the typical product liability case, the focus
of this Comment, the plaintiff is more likely than the defendant to be guilty of
destroying evidence. 2 When a plaintiff alleges a product is defective, the
product will be within his control at all times following the accident and
leading up to the suit. 3 If the allegedly defective product is destroyed before
the lawsuit is filed, testimony of the plaintiffs expert is the only remaining
evidence. 4 The defendant can hardly be expected to defend the case based
upon such one-sided evidence. 5
The court's response to spoliation depends heavily upon which party
destroyed the evidence.'6 However, the courts have not delineated or articulated
this distinction. When a defendant destroys evidence, the plaintiff's right to
recovery for his injuries has been severely limited. 7 Often the plaintiff needed
the evidence just to meet his burden of proof. Without the evidence, the
plaintiff is left with no grounds for continuing the suit. Some jurisdictions have
responded to this situation by allowing an independent tort action for
spoliation." Some courts have gone so far as to allow recovery in tort for
negligent spoliation, thereby punishing the defendant for even an innocent
destruction of evidence.' 9
However, when plaintiffs destroy evidence, it is unclear how the courts
should respond. A tort cause of action would be inappropriate because the
defendant has suffered no injury that would entitle it to separate recovery.20 The
defendant is interested in the missing evidence only to the extent that it
10. David A. Bell et al., Let's Level the Playing Field: A New Proposal for Analysis of
Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 771-72 (1997).
11. Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence-Compared
to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 LA. L. REv. 837, 859-62 (1998).
There has been little recognition by courts or scholars of the importance of determining which
party destroyed the evidence. However, this distinction is critical as some remedies are exclusive
to a particular party. It is hard to imagine, for example, how a defendant could have an
independent cause of action for spoliation. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
12. This is not because plaintiffs are less ethical than defendants, but because in the
product liability context, the plaintiff usually has possession of the product.
13. John F. Kuppens, There Is No Substitute: Spoliation of Evidence in Product Liability
Suits, S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28 (discussing the remedies available when the plaintiff
destroys evidence).
14. Id. at 30-31.
15. Id.
16. Id. at31.
17. See Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992). In Rodgers,
the plaintiff suffered physical injuries but was unable to pursue a personal injury suit because
the hospital failed to preserve the plaintiff's x-rays. Id. at 618. The court allowed an independent
suit against the hospital for violating Illinois' X-Ray Retention Act. Id. at 620.
18. Losavio, supra note 11, at 839-40.
19. Id. at 842-43.
20. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 371 (9th Cir.
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provides a defense to the spoliator's suit.2 1 Therefore, an independent cause of
action is not warranted. Following this logic, courts have granted escalating
remedies to defendants in spoliation cases beginning with an adverse jury
instruction.' However, no jurisdiction has made an independent tort cause of
action available to defendants. The more significant remedies the courts have
recognized are the exclusion of any testimony relating to the missing evidence'
and even dismissal of the plaintiff s case.24 It is difficult to determine the
appropriate sanction under the facts of a particular case. In any spoliation case,
two competing and compelling considerations exist-the right of the plaintiff
to have his day in court and the prejudice suffered by the defendant in
defending the case. How does a court determine which consideration should
predominate?
The hypothetical described at the outset of this Comment is based on
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp.,' a case which effectively demonstrates
some of the difficulties the courts face when a plaintiff destroys evidence
before the defendant has an opportunity to conduct its own investigation. Such
destruction leaves the defendant unable to completely develop theories of
alternative causes of the accident or to counter the plaintiff's claim that a
particular mechanism was defective. Furthermore, the defendant must refute
expert testimony offered by the plaintiff2 From the jury's perspective, the
plaintiff has put forth a convincing case based upon the testimony of a credible
expert. The defendant, on the other hand, can counter only with speculation,
unsupported by any expert testimony. The prejudice to the defendant is
obvious, and the only issue to be resolved is the appropriate remedy.
Directing sanctions against the plaintiff might be too extreme. This is
especially true if the plaintiff did not destroy the evidence himself, as was the
case in Vodusek,27 or destroyed the evidence unintentionally.28 The plaintiff in
Vodusek suffered legitimate injuries from the boat accident and may have been
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Kershaw County Bd. ofEduc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390,394-95,396
S.E.2d 369,372 (1990) (allowing an adverse inference when plaintiff inexplicably disposed of
evidence in violation of a court order); Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156-57
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that an adversejury instruction would be the appropriate sanction absent
bad-faith conduct by the plaintiff).
23. See, e.g., Unigard, 982 F.2d at 368 (affirming the trial court's decision to exclude the
plaintiffs expert testimony, thereby leading to a dismissal due to a lack of evidence).
24. See, e.g., Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883,885 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (granting
the defendant summary judgment due to the prejudice it suffered by being unable to inspect the
evidence),
25. 71 F.3d 148.
26. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 (D. Mass. 1991).
27. Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 155.
28. See Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 394-95, 396
S.E.2d 369, 372 (1990) (involving plaintiff school board that unintentionally violated a court
order not to remove asbestos without first notifying the defendant).
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entitled to damages.29 Sanctions might prevent such a recovery. Prejudice to the
defendant and plaintiffs' rights to recover are in constant tension, and the
spoliation doctrine attempts to balance these competing policies.3"
In Vodusek, the court held that an adverse jury instruction was the
appropriate sanction for the plaintiff's destruction of evidence.3 The jury was
instructed that it could infer that the destroyed evidence "would have been
unfavorable to the plaintiff s theory in the case."32 But how effectively does this
remedy level the playing field for the defendant, who is still unable to inspect
the evidence or to effectively counter the plaintiffs expert? Would a more
severe sanction, such as excluding the expert's testimony or dismissing the
plaintiffs case, be too harsh? These are the types of questions many courts
have grappled with,33 but which no South Carolina court has endeavored to
answer. In this state, there has been no attempt to adopt a sophisticated
framework for dealing with the problems caused by spoliation of evidence.34
South Carolina courts have permitted an adverse inference to be drawn against
the destroying party in only a few cases.35 For these reasons, this Comment will
analyze the various approaches to spoliation committed by plaintiffs in
products liability cases and will recommend an approach for the South Carolina
courts to adopt in the future.
Part II of this Comment will discuss different problems with and
perspectives on spoliation and will culminate with an analysis of the various
tests courts apply to determine if sanctions for spoliation are appropriate. Part
III will explore the next step after finding sanctions are appropriate, namely the
determination of what remedy is appropriate in a particular case. Part III will
also discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the various remedies. Part IV will
focus specifically on South Carolina case law and the spoliation sanctions that
South Carolina courts have recognized. Finally, Part V will offer an approach
South Carolina courts should adopt to provide sanctions commensurate with
the severity of the plaintiff s misconduct.
29. Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 151.
30. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76,79 (3d Cir. 1994) (employing
a test for imposing sanctions which measures both the fault of the plaintiff and the prejudice to
the defendant).
31. Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 157.
32. Id. at 155.
33. See Losavio, supra note 11, at 838-69 (surveying many of the problems which have
arisen in spoliation cases).
34. See Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268, 1284 (D.S.C. 1995) (noting that
South Carolina has neverrecognized a tortremedy for a defendant's spoliation); Kuppens, supra
note 13, at 31 (noting that the adverse inference is the only sanction recognized in South
Carolina and discussing the various remedies available elsewhere).
35. See, e.g., Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 395, 396
S.E.2d 369, 372 (1990) (finding an adverse inference to be the proper remedy for inadvertent
spoliation by plaintiff school board); Gathers v. S.C. Elec. & Gas, 311 S.C. 81, 83, 427 S.E.2d
687, 689 (Ct. App. 1993) (allowing adverse inference when defendant disconnected and
discarded the power line that apparently electrocuted the plaintiff).
[Vol. 53: 415
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II. GENERAL SPOLIATION ISSUES
.A. Source ofAuthority For Imposing Sanctions
Exploring the source of the court's authority to impose sanctions highlights
an important distinction within the spoliation cases. In Unigard Security
Insurance Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Corp.,36 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude evidence offered by the
plaintiff, but it disagreed with the trial court's choice of authority in excluding
the evidence.37 In Unigard, there was a fire on a yacht insured by the plaintiff.38
The plaintiff's expert blamed the fire on a space heater manufactured by the
defendant.39 However, the plaintiff's subrogation department determined that
the defendant would not be liable because the space heater was labeled with a
warning which admonished the user not to leave the unit unattended." The
plaintiff's subrogation department discarded the heater and the remaining
evidence.4 However, after hiring a new attorney to handle subrogation cases,
the plaintiff decided to file suit.42 The trial court excluded the testimony of the
plaintiff s expert because the defendant was unable to inspect the evidence. 3
The trial court based its decision to exclude the evidence upon Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37.44 However, Rule 37(b) allows the court to impose
sanctions only where a party violates a discovery order.45 In many cases, the
court has issued an order during discovery directing the parties to preserve any
relevant evidence in their possession.46 In Unigard, there was no such
discovery order. 7 Obviously, there could not have been such an order as the
evidence was destroyed before the lawsuit was ever filed.' The very futility of
issuing such an order led the trial court to apply the discovery-sanctions
provision, notwithstanding the literal language of the rule. 9 The court reasoned
that "'the principles underlying [Rule 37] extend[ed] to situations where
compulsion orders would be futile, because the evidence ha[d] been
36. 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 368.




42. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 365.
43. Id. at 366.
44. Id. at 367; see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
46. See, e.g., Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390,394,396
S.E.2d 369, 371 (1990) (involving court order directing plaintiff schools not to remove any
asbestos without notifying the defendant).
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destroyed."'"0 The Ninth Circuit rejected this analysis, refusing to allow such
a broad interpretation of Rule 37(b). ' However, the Ninth Circuit did not
reverse the trial court's decision, choosing instead to exclude the testimony of
the plaintiff's expert under a different authority.52
The Ninth Circuit noted that the court has an inherent power to control the
parties and proceedings before it.53 The court referred to its commonly-
recognized authority to exclude testimony and evidence that would be too
prejudicial to an opposing party.54 It held that the sanction imposed by the trial
court could properly be levied pursuant to this authority.55 Therefore, the court
needed no extrinsic statutory authority to impose sanctions for spoliation.
The court's inherent power is, by definition, broader than any statutory
authority. It is not restricted by the language of Rule 37. Thus, it would allow
remedies in a wider range of situations. In Unigard, the trial court wished to
sanction the plaintiff but was constrained by the plain language of Rule 37.
However, the trial court's decision to ignore the limited language of the rule
was improper.5 6
While the scope of the court's inherent authority is broader than that of
statutorily-based authority, the range of remedies remains the same. The three
main sanctions listed under Rule 37(b)-an adverse inference, exclusion of
evidence, and dismissal-are the same that have been applied in the spoliation
context.
5 7
The source of authority may at first appear unimportant. When a situation
not covered by Rule 37 arises, the court can simply turn to its inherent power
to impose sanctions. However, the Unigard opinion demonstrates why the issue
is relevant. The trial court in Unigard apparently felt constrained by the
discovery rules, as demonstrated by the great lengths to which it went to stretch
Rule 37 to justify sanctions." Additionally, the only authority from the South
Carolina Supreme Court discussing spoliation sanctions did so in the context
of discovery sanctions. 9 A South Carolina trial court could easily interpret the
Kershaw opinion as limiting its authority to impose sanctions. Thus, to properly
understand the spoliation issue, it is important to understand the source of the
court's authority.
50. Id. (quoting Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 967, 976-77 (D.D.C.
1984)).
51. Id. at 367-68.
52. Id.




57. See infra Part III.
58. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 367.
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B. Tests For Imposing Sanctions
The destruction of evidence does not necessarily indicate that sanctions
will be imposed against the spoliator. Courts have adopted many tests for
determining when sanctions are appropriate. One of the most widely-accepted
standards was formulated by the Third Circuit in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric
Tool Corp.6 The Schmid court found it appropriate to impose sanctions by
weighing the following factors:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed
the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the
opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that
will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and,
where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to
deter such conduct by others in the future.6 '
The Schmid test highlights the two most important considerations to be
weighed in spoliation claims-the conduct of the destroyer and the resultant
prejudice suffered by the other party.62 The elements of the test also
demonstrate the difficulty in striking a balance between these two
considerations.
The difficulty in managing these two sometimes contrary considerations
was acknowledged by the Schmid court when it stated that "we consider it
more prudent to rely on the traditional case by case approach" rather than adopt
a uniform rule which could result in injustice in many situations.63 While the
first two factors are the most important in deciding whether to impose
sanctions, the third factor merely speaks to determining the appropriate remedy.
Thus, while the Schmidtest consists of three factors, the court really weighs the
first two and subsequently applies the third to determine the appropriate
remedy.
With such a fact-specific approach, disparate results can occur from
application of the same test. InbothSchmidandSchroederv. Commonwealth,"
the courts applied the three factors to reverse trial court dismissals for
spoliation.65 The courts felt dismissal was too harsh under the circumstances.66
60. 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994).
61. Id. at 79; see also Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(applying the Schmid test to justify granting summary judgment); Anderson v. Nat'l R.RL
Passenger Corp., 866 F. Supp. 937, 945 (E.D. Va. 1994) (applying the blameworthiness
requirement from the Schmid test); Schroeder v. Commonwealth, 710 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1998)
(adopting the Schmid test for judging whether sanctions are appropriate).
62. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79.
63. Id. at 81.
64. 710 A.2d 23 (Pa. 1998).
65. Id. at27; Schmid, 13 F.3d at 81.
66. Schroeder, 710 A.2d at 28; Schmid, 13 F.3d at 81.
2002]
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However, in Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., a different court applied the same
factors to a similar set of facts and found that dismissal of the plaintiff's case
was appropriate.'
A second test, applied by some district courts in the First Circuit, focuses
on five factors: "1) prejudice to the defendant, 2) whether the prejudice can be
cured, 3) the practical importance of the evidence, 4) whether the plaintiff
[acted] in good faith or bad faith, and 5) the potential for abuse."6 The only
significant difference between Schmid and the First Circuit test is the latter's
specific reference to the notion of bad faith. In many jurisdictions, such as the
Fourth Circuit, bad faith has been regarded as a prerequisite to obtaining
dismissal. 9 Bad faith is a higher standard than the fault-based test articulated
in Schmid, which a court could use to allow sanctions whenever a party is
guilty of destroying evidence regardless of the party's intent. Therefore, the
First Circuit test seems to place more emphasis on the conduct of the spoliator
rather than on the spoliation's effect on the other party. However, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet adopted this test, so it is unclear if it is the
definitive test for spoliation in that circuit.70
The Tenth Circuit has adopted still a third test for imposing sanctions for
spoliation.7 This test takes into account the following: (1) the degree of
prejudice to the defendant's case, (2) whether the spoliation interfered with the
judicial process, (3) the plaintiffs culpability, (4) whether the plaintiff was
warned that noncompliance with discovery could result in dismissal, and (5) the
efficacy of imposing a lighter sanction.72 By its very language, this test applies
specifically to the remedies available for violations of Rule 37.73 Thus, the two
basic considerations present in the other tests-the spoliator's conduct and the
prejudice to the other party-must also be weighed against the effect the
destruction of evidence has had on the discovery process.
While the language of the tests may vary slightly, the underlying
considerations are the same. Despite any semantic differences, all courts weigh
the negative impact on the defendant against the nature of the plaintiffs
conduct to determine an appropriate sanction on a case-by-case basis. Various
jurisdictions may emphasize one factor over another, such as a specific
67. Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
68. Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.P.R. 1997).
69. Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1998). The same court has
recently backed away from a strict bad-faith requirement in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp.,
271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001), which recognizes that in some circumstances the prejudice
to the defendant is so extreme that bad-faith need not be clear, but limits its holding to the facts
of the case. By limiting the holding in Sivestri, the Fourth Circuit still requires bad-faith conduct
to justify dismissal in most spoliation cases. Id. at 593.
70. Vazquez-Corales, 172 F.R.D. at 13.
71. Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992).
72. Id.
73. See Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920.
[Vol. 53: 415
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reference to bad faith or the discovery process, but all take the same
considerations into account.
III. SANCTIONS AVAILABLE FOR SPOLIATION
A. Adverse Instruction
After a court determines that sanctions are appropriate, it must then decide
on an appropriate penalty. The sanction imposed in Vodusek was an adverse
jury instruction against the plaintiff.74 Relevant sections of the jury instruction
were as follows:
The defendants contend that their access to relevant and
potentially relevant evidence was substantially hindered by
the actions of plaintiff s counsel and agents .... [I]t is the
duty of a party, a party's counsel and any expert witness, not
to take action that will cause the destruction or loss of
relevant evidence where that will hinder the other side from
making its own examination and investigation of all
potentially relevant evidence.
If you find in this case the plaintiff's counsel and
agents.., failed to fulfill this duty, then you may take this
into account when considering the credibility of [the
plaintiff's expert] and his opinions and also you are permitted
to, if you feel justified in doing so, assume that the evidence
made unavailable to the defendants by acts of plaintiffs
counsel or agents, including Mr. Halsey, would have been
unfavorable to the plaintiff's theory in the case.7'
An adverse inference is the minimum penalty that can be imposed upon a
spoliator.76 It is also the most common sanction imposed for spoliation."
However, some courts have limited the availability of an adverse instruction by
requiring that it not be granted when the plaintiff was merely negligent in
destroying evidence.78 Following this trend, the Vodusek court held that some
"willful conduct" must exist to grant such an instruction.7 9
74. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 155 (second alteration in original).
76. See FED. R. Cv. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
77. Losavio, supra note 11, at 862.
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To the jury, the adverse instruction may seem contradictory or even
meaningless."0 The jury has already been presented with testimony from the
plaintiff relating to the destroyed evidence which supports the plaintiff's theory
of the case. Then, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury is instructed to
somehow hold the plaintiff accountable for destroying the evidence. Using
Vodusek as an example, how does a juror reconcile the expert's testimony that
the condition of the boat supported the plaintiff's case with the instruction that
there should be a presumption that the boat's condition would have been
adverse to the plaintiff's case? Even a juror with the best of intentions would
find it difficult to effectively counter the impact of such concrete evidence with
the abstract notion of a negative inference.
Adverse instructions also fail to curtail the temptation for dishonesty "in
light of the tremendous benefit a spoliator can obtain by [the] destruction [of
evidence]."81 Spoliation cases often involve insurance companies pursuing
subrogation claims against manufacturers.8" In such a situation, an insurance
company may be tempted to have an expert inspect the insured item to compile
some credible scientific evidence to support its subrogation claim and then to
destroy the evidence. As a result, the defendant cannot counter the evidence
and the spoliatior's position at trial is greatly strengthened. If the worst sanction
the insurance company will face from such behavior is an adverse instruction,
then there is no real incentive against misbehavior. Additionally, the prospect
of recouping at least a portion of the claims the company has had to pay off to
its policyholders provides a strong financial incentive to create or strengthen
dubious claims against manufacturers through dishonest means. As the court
noted in Chapman v. Auto Owners Insurance Co., "in certain circumstances,
allowing the case to proceed or an expert to testify about destroyed
evidence... may result in trial by ambush which cannot be cured by a jury
instruction." 3
B. Dismissal
For the reasons listed above, courts have resorted to a variety of measures
other than the adverse jury instruction to sanction parties for destroying
80. See Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 51-52 (1997) (discussing the inability of many jurors to understand the
judge's instructions).
81. Losavio, supra note 11, at 862.
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlinson, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (involving
an insurance company that took possession of the plaintiffs car and disposed of it before
bringing subrogation claim); Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., 587 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (dealing with an insurance company which demolished plaintiffs house and sent the
allegedly defective car to the salvage yard before filing suit).
83. Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
[Vol. 53:415
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evidence. 4 The most extreme measure is dismissal of the case."5 By dismissing
a case, the court denies the plaintiff his day in court. For this reason, the courts
require some intentional misbehavior on the part of the spoliator to impose this
ultimate sanction. However, the exact level of conduct necessary to trigger
sanctions varies.86 This divergence is due to the underlying tension between the
plaintiff's rights and the prejudice to the defendant. While courts feel
compelled to dismiss cases in certain circumstances due to the extreme
prejudice suffered by the defendant coupled with misconduct by the plaintiff,
they seem very hesitant to apply such a severe sanction. 7 The cases dealing
with dismissal easily can be categorized into those which require bad faith and
those which require some lesser malfeasance on the part of the spoliator.
Vodusek was the first case dealing with spoliation of evidence in the Fourth
Circuit. 8 However, it discussed only an adverse instruction, thus leaving the
question of stricter sanctions unsettled. 9 Cole v. Keller Industries, another
Fourth Circuit case, was argued just two months after Vodusek, yet it was not
decided for another three years.9" In Cole, the plaintiff was injured while using
a ladder manufactured by the defendant.91 In a now familiar scenario, the
plaintiff's expert took the ladder apart during his inspection.' The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but the Fourth Circuit reversed.93
The Fourth Circuit surveyed many spoliation cases and concluded that "the vast
weight ofauthority ... holds that absent bad-faith conduct applying a rule of
law that results in dismissal on the grounds of spoliation of evidence is not
authorized."94
The Fourth Circuit has recently relaxed its requirement of bad-faith in
Silvestri v. General Motors Corp.,9' finding that in some circumstances the
defendant suffers such extreme prejudice that it is not an abuse of the trial
84. See, e.g., Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (granting
dismissal for spoliation).
85. See, e.g., Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.P.R. 1997)
(discussing the harshness of dismissal and the limited circumstances where such a sanction
would be appropriate).
86. See, e.g., Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1998) (requiring
bad faith by the spoliator to impose dismissal); Vazquez-Corales, 172 F.R.D. at 15 (finding
suspicious behavior by party in destroying evidence did not demonstrate bad faith conclusively
enough to justify dismissal); Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 786 (allowing trial court to impose
dismissal, with bad faith being an element to be considered by the court in determining the
appropriate sanction).
87. See Cole, 132 F.3d at 1047.
88. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
89. Cole, 132 F.3d at 1047.
90. Id. at 1044.
91. Id. at 1045.
92. Id. at 1046.
93. Id. at 1048.
94. Id. at 1047.
95. 271 F.3d583 (2001).
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court's discretion to dismiss the case due to the plaintiff's spoliation.96 The
plaintiff in Silvestri claimed that the airbag in his vehicle was defective and
thus aggrevated his injuries in a car wreck." After the plaintiff's experts
investigated the crash and advised the plaintiff's lawyer that Silvestri did not
have a case, they opined that the vehicle should be preserved so that General
Motors could conduct an investigation.98 However, this advice was not heeded
and the car was sold before the defendant was able to inspect the vehicle."
Furthermore, the plaintiffs experts performed incomplete investigations that
reached contradictory conclusions as to the speed and severity of the crash." °
While the holding in Silvestri initially may seem to severely limit the scope of
Cole, the Silvestri court's decision to affirm dismissal was limited to the
"peculiar circumstances of this case.''. Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, dismissal
is still "usually justified only in circumstances of bad-faith."'0 2
While all the tests weigh to some degree the plaintiff s conduct, the
jurisdictions that require a showing of bad faith have chosen to emphasize the
plaintiffs right to recover. In such jurisdictions, a high level of misconduct
must exist for a court to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing its suit.
Not all courts have agreed with the requirement of bad faith to justify
dismissal. In Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff claimed that a defective
seatbelt caused him injury.0 3 The plaintiff s lawyer asked the salvage yard to
preserve the belts, which it did.' However, plaintiff's counsel neverpicked up
the belts, and the salvage yard eventually discarded them.' The court held that
dismissal was appropriate because the spoliation "render[ed] a full defense
impossible."'" 6
However, the Moyers opinion is flawed in one crucial aspect. The court
cites Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co.'0 7 for the proposition that, even absent any
evidence of bad faith, sanctions can be imposed.0 8 It also cites Unigard
Security Insurance Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Corp. for
the idea that dismissal is an appropriate sanction to cure the prejudice to the
defendant in spoliation cases.0 9 However, in Unigard the spoliation was
96. Id. at 595.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Id. at 587.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 587.
101. Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 595.
102. Id. at 593.
103. Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 885-86.
107. 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993).
108. Moyers, 941 F. Supp. at 884 (citing Dillon, 986 F.2d at 266-69).
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actually remedied by excluding the evidence."' The case was dismissed' only
because without the evidence, the plaintiffcouldnot meet its burden of proof."
Dillon presented a similar situation-the court excluded the plaintiff's
testimony, which then caused the plaintiff to lose his case." 2 The Moyers court
failed to distinguish between exclusion of evidence and outright dismissal." 3
The Moyers decision was not based on the plaintiff's inability to prove his case
once he was stripped of the evidence; his case was simply dismissed.",4 Moyers
provides a very harsh result which, coupled with the misreading of Unigard,
makes the decision somewhat suspect.
The distinction between exclusion and dismissal is crucial, as there are
many situations where the plaintiff can continue to pursue claims without
evidence about the exact product that injured him. For example, if the
complaint alleges a design defect, then the plaintiff can still meet its burden of
proof by looking to other identical products."' If the complaint alleges that the
gas tank of a particular car model is unreasonably dangerous, then the plaintiff
can prove this claim by using another car of the same make and model as
evidence. There is nothing unique to the car that injured the plaintiff.
Therefore, excluding testimony relative to the plaintiff's particular car would
not be fatal to his case.
The Moyers court's loose interpretation of Unigard demonstrates the
tendency of courts to employ strained interpretations of previous authority or
to create new theories to justify dismissal in the spoliation context." 6 In fact,
the trial court in Unigardwas guilty of the same pro-defendant attitude." 7 The
trial court in Unigard employed a rather strained interpretation of Rule 37 to
justify imposing sanctions."' Consistent with these cases, the trial court in Cole
v. Keller Industries, Inc. also dismissed the case due to the plaintiff's
spoliation." 9 In the latter two cases, appellate courts corrected the legal
reasoning of the trial courts.' The Moyers decision has not been reviewed at
the appellate level, so its precedential value is questionable.
Appellate courts generally require a showing of some intentional
misconduct orbad-faith conduct to impose a sanction as drastic as dismissal.''
Among the few appellate-level decisions affirming dismissal without an
110. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 368.
111. Id. at 366, 369.
112. Dillon, 986 F.2d at 266.
113. See Moyers, 941 F. Supp. at 884-85.
114. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
115. Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.P.R. 1997).
116. See Moyers, 941 F. Supp. at 884-85.
117. Unigard See. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 367-68 (9th
Cir. 1992).
118. Id. at 367.
119. Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1046 (4th Cir. 1998).
120. Id. at 1047; Unigard, 982 V.2d at 368.
121. Cole, 132 F.3d at 1047.
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express requirement of bad faith are Silvestri" and Chapman v. Auto Owners
Insurance Co.?2 The Chapman court authorized the trial judge to impose
stronger sanctions than an adverse inference, up to and including dismissal.'
In response to the plaintiffs argument that bad faith must be present before
dismissal could be granted, the court only stated that "the plaintiff s good or
bad faith is an issue for the trial court's consideration."'" The main focus of
spoliation sanctions, according to the court of appeals, is to avoid "trial by
ambush."' 26 This focus suggests an emphasis on protecting the rights of the
non-spoliating party.
Bad faith is the more pervasive legal standard for dismissal,
notwithstanding outlying trial-level decisions like Moyers. Such a standard may
be needed to protect plaintiffs possessing legitimate grounds for recovery. A
standard allowing dismissal for less severe or unintentional conduct would be
too harsh in many situations.
However, a bad-faith requirement makes it very difficult to prove that the
plaintiff's conduct justifies dismissal. The destruction usually (excepting the
discovery sanctions cases) takes place before trial under circumstances
unknown to the defendant. Moreover, the lesser sanction of an adverse jury
instruction hardly remedies the prejudice to the defendant. Some middle ground
is needed to balance both parties' interests.
C. Exclusion of Evidence
The courts have applied a third sanction, exclusion of the spoliated
evidence, which aims to balance the parties' conflicting interests. The Unigard
court applied this sanction and excluded testimony relating to the destroyed
evidence. 27 This prohibition applies not only to direct testimony by the
plaintiff's expert but also to any reports or secondary evidence, such as photos
of the scene, taken by the expert.'28 Exclusion is a sanction that has been
approved in other jurisdictions.'29
122. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
123. 469 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Id. at 786.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368-69 (9th
Cir. 1992).
128. Hoffman v. Ford Motor Corp., 587 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
129. See, e.g., N. Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281,284 (D. Me. 1993) (finding that
while dismissal would be too severe, exclusion of the evidence was appropriate despite the lack
of any showing that plaintiff acted deliberately); Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.RD.
362, 365-66 (D. Mass. 1991) (excluding plaintiff's expert evidence due to the prejudice to
defendant and the advantage plaintiff would obtain otherwise); Hoffman, 587 N.W.2d at 72
(excluding the testimony of the plaintiff's expert regarding the cause of the fire in plaintiff's
garage after the evidence was destroyed).
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In Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., two fires erupted in Daniel Hoffinan's
garage in the space of three days. 3 ' He filed a claim with his insurance
company, which sent two different experts to perform a cause-and-origin
investigation of the fires.' The experts determined the fires were caused by
Hoffman's new Ford Taurus.'32 The insurance company then sent the car to a
salvage yard and demolished the garage and house without providing the
defendant an opportunity to inspect the evidence.'33
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to
exclude the plaintiff's expert testimony as an appropriate sanction for spoliation
of evidence.'34 As the court noted, "[A] fire scene itself is the best evidence of
the origin and the cause of a fire.""' Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he
propriety of a sanction for the spoliation of evidence is determined by the
prejudice resulting to the opposing party."'
36
While excluding the plaintiffs expert testimony is a less severe sanction
than dismissal, the practical result is often the same. 3 When the plaintiff
alleges that a product contains a manufacturing defect, the product itself is
often the only evidence that can prove the defect.'38 If the plaintiff cannot
introduce expert testimony relating to the condition of the product, then it is
nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof. The court will grant summary
judgment to the defendant because there is not enough evidence to proceed.
However, in certain circumstances, excluding testimony relating to the
missing evidence as opposed to granting dismissal will still leave room for the
plaintiff to recover for his injuries. The plaintiff may have other relevant
evidence or may attempt to prove an alternative theory for the cause of the
accident. The Vodusek case is a perfect example.'39 In Vodusek, the plaintiff
alleged that the explosion was caused by a faulty bilge pump and a leaking fuel
system.' " What if the plaintiff s expert had destroyed the boat but retained the
bilge pump? Dismissal would seem inappropriate under those circumstances.
The defendant would still have the opportunity to inspect the bilge pump to
determine whether it was defective. Therefore, there would be no unfairness in
litigating the claims regarding the bilge pump.
In contrast, the defendant would be unable to investigate the claims relating
to the fuel line. Extreme prejudice would result if the court allowed the plaintiff
130. Hoffnan v. Ford Motor Co., 587 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 69.
133. Id. at 68.
134. Id. at 72.
135. Id. at 71.
136. Hoffman, 587 N.W.2d at 71.
137. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363,369 (9th
Cir. 1992).
138. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.18 (D. Mass. 1991).
139. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 151.
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to introduce any evidence relating to the fuel line. This evidence would need
to be excluded from trial to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice. While
exclusion of this evidence might make recovery slightly more difficult for the
plaintiff, recovery would be far from impossible. If in fact the bilge pump was
defective, the plaintiff would be entitled to some measure of damages. The
amount might be less than would be available with all of the evidence, but the
plaintiff would be responsible for the loss of the evidence and would be forced
to suffer the consequences. The foregoing analysis shows how spoliation
remedies can be applied in a manner which is judicious and equitable to both
plaintiffs and defendants.
Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp.4' demonstrates the plaintiffs ability to
pursue alternative theories to avoid dismissal in a spoliation case. In Gentry, the
plaintiff alleged that her car's temperature control cable interfered with the
accelerator rod and caused the car to accelerate suddenly, thereby causing an
accident. 42 In the course of inspecting the car, the plaintiff s expert removed
both parts, thus making it impossible for the defendant's expert to determine
if the cable did in fact interfere with the accelerator rod.43 The defendant
moved to dismiss based on this spoliation.'" To avoid this result, the plaintiff
had a second expert inspect the car, and this expert determined that the
carburetor caused the accident.1
45
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's decision to
dismiss the case for spoliation because the missing evidence, namely the
accelerator rod and temperature control cable, no longer formed the basis for
the plaintiffs claim." The defendant had access to the carburetor and thus
could effectively counter the plaintiff s claims and avoid prejudice arising from
the spoliation. 147 However, if the missing parts had remained crucial to the
plaintiffs case, the defendant might have been entitled to a dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims.
While there exist numerous distinctions between the spoliation cases, such
as the source of the authority or the test used to impose sanctions, the courts
have levied only three sanctions for the destruction of evidence. The adverse
inference is the most widely used and is easily obtained. 14 ' However, as
discussed above, 49 its practical effect is highly questionable. The defendant is
left in the unenviable position of defending the case with no concrete evidence.
At the other extreme lies dismissal. It is rarely granted, or at least rarely upheld
at the appellate level, absent some evidence of intentional or bad-faith
141. 471 S.E.2d 485 (Va. 1996).
142. Id. at 486.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 487.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 488.
147. Gentry, 471 S.E.2d at 487.
148. Losavio, supra note 11, at 862.
149. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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destruction of evidence by the plaintiff. The requisite intent is very difficult to
prove.' Exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony remains as a middle
ground for balancing the right of the plaintiff to a day in court and the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ON SPOLIATION
South Carolina courts have not dealt extensively with the issue of
spoliation. Even the cases that address the issue do so in a limited manner. No
appellate court in South Carolina has attempted to provide an overview of the
law on spoliation in this state or to explore the remedies available to a non-
destroying party.
Despite this limited common-law authority, it is clear that South Carolina
has long recognized the court's power to sanction parties for mishandling
evidence."' In Welsh v. Gibbons, the plaintiff claimed to have purchased a
bottle of soda containing a "deleterious substance."' 2 The defendant asked for
the bottle so that it could be tested, but the plaintiff refused to turn it over. 53
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that while the plaintiff had the legal
right not to turn over the evidence, his failure to do so should be a factor in the
jury's determination of his good faith and the likely impact of the missing
evidence on his case."'4
Wisconsin Motor Corp. v. Green'55 involved a situation similar to Welsh.
In Wisconsin Motor, a retailer testified that it paid a manufacturer for certain
goods but was unable to produce any records to support this testimony.'56 The
supreme court noted the following:
It is well settled that if a party fails to produce the testimony
of an available witness or witnesses on a material issue in the
case, or produce available records, it may be inferred that the
testimony, or the contents of the records, if presented, would
be adverse to the party who fails to call the witness or present
the records. 57
150. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
151. See Wisconsin Motor Corp. v. Green, 224 S.C. 460,464,79 S.E.2d 718,720 (1954)
(allowing an adverse inference for failure to produce records); Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S.C. 516,
526,46 S.E.2d 147,151-52 (1948) (affirming imposition ofan adverse inference againstplaintiff
for withholding evidence).
152. Welsh, 211 S.C. at 517-18,46 S.E.2d at 147.
153. Id. at 518, 46 S.E.2d at 148.
154. Id. at 523,46 S.E.2d at 150. Of course, the plaintiff is no longer allowed to withhold
evidence under the modem liberal rules of discovery. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 26.
155. 224 S.C. 460, 79 S.E.2d 718 (1954).
156. Id. at 465-66, 79 S.E.2d at 720-21.
157. Id. at 464, 79 S.E.2d at 720.
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While these cases deal specifically with the failure of a party to produce
evidence and not with the destruction of evidence, they demonstrate the
availability of sanctions when a party mishandles evidence. They also parallel
the typical fact situation in a spoliation case. A party brings a claim based upon
a certain piece of evidence and introduces testimony regarding the evidence,
but the evidence is not made available to the defendant. Whether the defendant
is unable to inspect the evidence because the other party simply withheld it or
actually destroyed it, the practical effect and prejudice are the same. For this
reason, cases like Welsh and Wisconsin Motor provide excellent insight into
South Carolina's method for dealing with mishandling evidence, and their logic
can easily be imported into the spoliation context.
Nearly fifty years after Welsh and Wisconsin Motor, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed a sanction for spoliation.'58 InKershaw County Board
of Education v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
sanctioning of the plaintiff with an adverse jury instruction.'59 Kershaw
involved an asbestos suit brought by several Kershaw County schools."6
During discovery, the trial judge entered an order prohibiting any of the school
boards from removing asbestos from their buildings until the defendant was
given an opportunity to inspect the material.' 61 However, for unknown reasons
the Kershaw County School Board did remove some asbestos without notifying
the defendant. 62 The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss due to spoliation
of evidence. 63 The court denied this motion, deciding instead to "include ajury
instruction on the destruction of evidence," instructing the jury that it could
infer that the evidence would have been adverse to the school board."6
Kershaw presents the first language in a South Carolina appellate-level decision
affirming a sanction against a party specifically for destroying evidence.
While the use of an adverse instruction for spoliation appears similar to an
instruction for withholding evidence, Kershaw still represents a drastic
departure from cases like Welsh and Wisconsin. First, Kershaw involved a
situation where a party actually discarded a crucial piece of evidence rather
than simply refusing to disclose it.'65 Second, in Kershaw, the trial court had
entered a discovery order not to destroy any of the evidence, and the Kershaw
158. Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 396 S.E.2d 369
(1990).
159. Id. at 394-95, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
160. Id. at 392, 396 S.E.2d at 370.
161. Id. at 394, 396 S.E.2d at 371.
162. Id. at 394, 396 S.E.2d at 371.
163. Id. at 394, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
164. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 394, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
165. This difference did not seem so obvious to the Kershaw court, which interpreted
Welsh as applying to situations where "evidence was lost or destroyed." Id. at 394, 396 S.E.2d
at 372. However, the Welsh opinion never refers to evidence being lost or destroyed. It focuses
solely upon the issue of a party's failure to produce evidence in its possession. Welsh v.
Gibbons, 211 S.C. 516, 523-26, 46 S.E.2d 147, 150-52 (1948).
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County School Board violated the order. 66 This fact was crucial because it
provided the court with the authority to impose sanctions. Since the school
board violated a discovery order, the trial court based its ruling on the rules of
discovery rather than on the court's inherentpower to control the parties before
it.167
In Kershaw, the defendant requested that the court dismiss the case to
sanction the plaintiff for removing the asbestos. 61 The plaintiff school board
clearly violated a discovery order, therefore justifying sanctions under South
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 37.169 However, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's denial of dismissal as being "too severe under the facts of this
case."'
70
The source of the court's sanctioningpowerbecomes important when more
severe sanctions are considered. For example, in Unigard, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's reliance on discovery sanctions as a
means of excluding evidence offered by the plaintiff, instead finding the
sanctioning authority in the court's inherent power. 17' The literal language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 authorizes only sanctions imposed by a trial
judge for a violation of a discovery order,'72 and there was no such order in
Unigard73 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that reliance on Rule 37
was inappropriate. 74 Since the inherent power of the court is much broader
than statutorily-granted authority, the inherent power permits sanctions in a
greater number of situations. If discovery sanctions are the only method to
obtain a remedy for spoliation in South Carolina, Kershaw represents a serious
limitation on parties' ability to obtain meaningful sanctions for spoliation.
Despite the possible limitation discussed above, Kershawhardly forecloses
the possibility of obtaining a dismissal for spoliation. The opinion itself
suggests a situation where dismissal may be appropriate. 75 In support of its
holding that dismissal would be too harsh, the court noted that "there was no
evidence of any intentional misconduct."' 17 6 The obvious implication of this
statement is that if a party does exhibit intentional misconduct, a sanction as
166. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 394, 396 S.E. 2d at 371.
167. Id. at 395, 396 S.E. 2d at 372. In a case involving only an adverse inference, the use
of the rules of discovery rather than the court's inherent power to sanction a party would not be
a terribly important distinction. An adverse inference is a minimal sanction for spoliation and
is not terribly prejudicial to the spoliator. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. However,
when a more severe sanction is at issue, the source of authority becomes more important.
168. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 394, 396 S.E. 2d at 372.
169. Id. at 395, 396 S.E.2d at 372; see S.C. R. CIV. P. 37 (b)(2)(C).
170. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 395, 396 S.E. 2d at 372.
171. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363,368 (9th Cir.
1992); see supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
172. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37.
173. Unigard, 982 F.2d at 367.
174. Id. at 368.
175. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 395,396 S.E. 2d at 372.
176. Id. at 395, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
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severe as dismissal may be appropriate. However, the opinion gives no
examples of conduct that would meet this standard.
Some guidance can be obtained by comparing the language from Kershaw
with the bad-faith standard found in the Fourth Circuit cases and with the
Moyers standard that aimed to protect the defendant from prejudice.' Because
the word "misconduct"''7 is used, the standard in Kershaw seems more like the
Fourth Circuit test, which focuses more on the conduct of the spoliator than on
the prejudice to the defendant. 79 By contrast, Moyers emphasizes the latter
factor.' Under a bad-faith standard, it is much more difficult to obtain
sanctions. Proving the subjective intent of the party who destroyed evidence is
almost impossible, especially since the destruction occurs before or shortly
after the opposing party is put on notice of the claim.' Therefore, the opposing
party is at a severe disadvantage and lacks any practical remedy.
There exists a final South Carolina case on spoliation. In Gathers v. South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co., the plaintiffwas killed when he touched a copper
water pipe under his home. 2 The defendant inspected the pipe and found an
electric current flowing through it.83 To prevent another accident, the
defendant disconnected the service line leading to the house.'84 When power
was restored with a new line, the current was no longer flowing through the
water pipe.' 5 The defendant disconnected the power line only to prevent injury,
yet the court held that the fact-finder could draw an inference that the evidence
would be adverse to the defendant.
8 6
Gathers is significant for two reasons. First, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals based its authority to order an adverse inference against the defendant
on Kershaw, yet it made no reference to discovery sanctions.8 7 Thus, the court
of appeals interpreted the supreme court's Kershaw opinion to mean that
spoliation sanctions are not limited to the rules of discovery. Second, an
adverse inference was drawn against the defendant despite its relatively benign
and even laudable motive of preventing further injury.' Sanctions are
therefore available in South Carolina even when the spoliator's motives are
neutral or benevolent. This holding is contrary to that of Vodusek, which would
not allow an adverse instruction unless the spoliator exhibited willful conduct
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 395, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
179. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
180. Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
181. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
182. Gathers v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 311 S.C. 81, 82, 427 S.E.2d 687, 688 (Ct. App.
1993).




187. Gathers, 311 S.C. at 83, 427 S.E.2d at 689 (citing Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 396 S.E.2d 369 (1990)).
188. Id. at 83, 427 S.E.2d at 689.
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that rose above mere negligence. 89 Gathers provides a remedy that is available
whenever a party destroys evidence relevant to an issue at trial, regardless of
the circumstances or the motives of the spoliator. However, Gathers does not
discuss the possibility of imposing more severe sanctions absent bad-faith
conduct by the spoliator.
The foregoing cases comprise the full body of South Carolina law on
spoliation. It is obviously difficult to delineate clear-cut rules governing
spoliation from such sparse authority. The courts' holdings provide mere
suggestions as to how they approach spoliation cases. However, at the same
time, the limited case law leaves a great deal of room to argue what should be
done in these cases.
V. SUGGESTIONS
The only sanction for spoliation ever expressly affirmed by an appellate
court in South Carolina is the adverse inference.'" Yet the very ease with
which this remedy has been obtained inboth South Carolina and throughout the
nation suggests that it is not a harsh penalty. Even assuming the jury
understands the judge's instruction to infer that the missing evidence would
have been adverse to the plaintiff, the jury is still likely to put much more stock
in the physical evidence that was presented at trial on the plaintiffs behalf.
Therefore, South Carolina courts should impose a more severe sanction in
spoliation cases.
The Kershaw case suggests that dismissal may be available in
circumstances where there is evidence of "intentional misconduct. 19 The use
of the term intentional misconduct indicates the necessity of a higher level of
malfeasance to warrant dismissal. As the heightened standard of conduct
suggests, dismissal would be too harsh in many circumstances. However, it is
easy to imagine circumstances where bad faith or malicious behavior has
occurred, but the defendant is unable to present any evidence regarding the
plaintiff s state of mind or the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the
evidence. Any cunning plaintiff would make sure of this. Even if the plaintiff
did not destroy the evidence intentionally, the prejudice to the defendant is still
the same and must be redressed. The Fourth Circuit recently recognized this
need by finding that in some instances the prejudice to the defendant is so great
that dismissal is justified without actual proof of bad-faith, despite earlier
rulings that bad faith must be present to justify dismissal.92 Such a ruling
demonstrates that the gap between the plaintiffs right to recovery and the
defendant's right to a fair trial is so great that the two extremes of an adverse
189. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
190. Kershaw, 302 S.C. at 395, 396 S.E.2d at 372.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
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inference and dismissal are not adequate to serve the interests ofjustice. Thus,
a third remedy must be available to the defendant.
Excluding the testimony of the plaintiff's expert is a fair remedy which
effectively balances the rights of both parties. The prejudice suffered by the
defendant in a spoliation case is that the defendant is unable to view the
missing evidence, while the plaintiff has been able to compile a great deal of
information about it. By excluding any testimony regarding the destroyed
evidence, the court places the parties on equal footing at trial. What the
Chapman court referred to as "trial by ambush" is avoided,'93 yet the plaintiff
is still able to present other evidence to prove its case.
However, in most cases the plaintiff will not be able to produce any
additional evidence that will allow the lawsuit to continue. In a manufacturing
defect case, the item itself is the only evidence of a defect.' 4 Thus, the practical
result with exclusion of evidence and dismissal is often the same. However, if
a party must suffer prejudice, it stands to reason that it should be the party that
made the evidence unavailable. Furthermore, there are situations where
testimony relating to the destroyed evidence could be excluded and the plaintiff
would be able to proceed with his case.'95 While exclusion of evidence is the
one sanction which has never been applied or referred to by the South Carolina
courts, it is the sanction which seems to produce the greatest amount of fairness
in most situations.
In summary, when a plaintiff intentionally destroys evidence to gain an
advantage at trial, he should not be allowed to proceed with his suit. However,
absent "intentional misconduct," the court should exclude testimony relating
to any evidence which the defendant was unable to inspect if the plaintiff was
responsible for the unavailability of the evidence. This latter situation would
occur more frequently than any other scenario in most spoliation cases, and
thus exclusion would become the most common sanction. However, situations
could arise where a third party disposed of evidence or the evidence was
destroyed due to circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control. In those
circumstances, the most appropriate remedy would be an adverse jury
instruction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The three sanctions for spoliation discussed above provide a framework
which aims to allow a plaintiff his day in court without unfairly prejudicing the
defendant. The sanctions provide a remedy whenever the defendant is unable
to inspect relevant evidence which was under the plaintiff s control, and as the
level of misconduct rises, so does the severity of the sanction that is justified.
The balancing act between these two considerations is the most difficult aspect
193. Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
194. Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.P.R. 1997).
195. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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of spoliation cases and requires a broad range of potential responses. It is
insufficient to allow only the two extremes of dismissal and an adverse
inference. Only when there is clear evidence as to the reasons, either malicious
or inadvertent, why the plaintiff failed to preserve the evidence are these
remedies appropriate. In the normal case, the motives and circumstances
surrounding the destruction are difficult to discern. To ensure fairness in these
situations, the trial court must have a third sanction at its disposal, namely the
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